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Abstract
With the increasing number of mobile applications and the popularity of cloud computing, the combination of
these two techniques that named mobile cloud computing (MCC) attracts great attention in recent years. However,
due to the risks associated with security and privacy, mobility security protection in MCC has become an important
issue. In this paper, we propose an efficient traceable access control scheme with reliable key delegation named
KD-TABE in MCC. Firstly, we present a traceable CP-ABE system and realize key delegation without loss of
traceability. Secondly, a new type of re-encryption method is proposed, which is based on an intuitive method that
supports any monotonic access tree instead of the re-encryption key. Lastly, to reduce trust on authority, we
separate the authority into three parts, and each authority is responsible for generating different components of
the key. The analysis shows that the proposed scheme can meet the security requirement of MCC. In addition, it
cost less compared with the other popular models.
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1 Introduction
With the increasing number of mobile applications and
the popularity of cloud computing, the combination of
these two techniques that named mobile cloud comput-
ing (MCC) attracts great attention listed by in recent
years [1, 2]. MCC is a service that allows mobile users
constrained with resources to adaptively adjust process-
ing and storing capabilities by transparently partitioning
and offloading the computationally intensive and storage
demanding jobs on traditional cloud resources by pro-
viding ubiquitous wireless access [2]. In the former mo-
bile computing paradigm, there are some problems such
as resource scarcity, frequent disconnections, and mobil-
ity. With the support of MCC, the aforementioned prob-
lems can be addressed and the mobile users can achieve
seamless access and handover for services, since mobile
applications are executed on resource providers external
to the mobile device.
However, the concerns with data privacy and security
threats have become an obstacle to hinder MCC from
being widely used [3]. According to the recent survey
conducted by the International Data Corporation, most
IT Executives and CEOs are not interested in adopting
such services due to the risks associated with security
and privacy [4, 5]. Therefore, it is necessary to eliminate
the potential security threats in MCC.
Lots of researchers devote to security issues in MCC,
such as secure MCC framework [4], access control [6–8],
authentication [9], trust [10], and so on. The abovemen-
tioned works all focus on protecting MCC from external
security threats. In [11], Liu et al. take insider threats into
consideration and propose a solution named traceable
ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE),
which can trace the malicious users or traitors who
intentionally leak the partial or modified decryption keys
for profits. While, in traceable CP-ABE, key delegation is
not supported, as they consider that key delegation will
prevent most of the expressive ABE systems and their var-
iants from being traceable [11]. Without key delegation,
each new user has to apply to the authority for his own
unique key. The overhead will be very heavy due to the
large number of mobile users in MCC. In this paper, we
propose an efficient traceable access control scheme with
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reliable key delegation named Key Delegation-Traceable
Attributed Based Encryption (KD-TABE) to tackle with
the aforementioned problems. And, the main contribu-
tions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
 We construct a traceable CP-ABE system with the
access tree and realize the key delegation at servers
without loss of traceability. We encrypt some
components of the key to prevent the key from
being maliciously delegated by malicious users or
traitors.
 We propose a new type of re-encryption method,
which is based on an intuitive method that supports
any monotonic access tree, instead of the re-
encryption key.
 To reduce trust on authority, we separate the
authority into three parts, and each authority is
responsible for generating different components of
the key. One is trusted and responsible for user
identity management; the other two are semi-
trusted and responsible for generating temporary
parameters.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the related work. Then, in Section 3, some
preliminaries have been given. Our scheme is stated
in Section 4. In Section 5, security analysis has been
provided. In Section 6, we evaluate the performance
of the proposed schema. Finally, the paper is con-
cluded in Section 7.
2 Related work
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is firstly proposed by
Sahai and Brent in [12]. A user’s identity is viewed as a
set of descriptive attributes, the attributes are taken as
public key, and the ciphertext will be decrypted as long
as the number of user’s attributes reaches a certain value
which is set in the encryption process. Since then, ABE
has become a research focus of the public key encryp-
tion field. Very soon afterwards, two ABE variants are
proposed: key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-
ABE) and CP-ABE. In KP-ABE scheme [13], the data ac-
cess policy (denoted as Au_KP) is specified by data
users; the ciphertext is labeled by a set of attributes
(denoted as A_o). The data user can decrypt the cipher-
text only if A_o satisfies A_KP. While, in CP-ABE
scheme [14], the data access policy (denoted as Ao_CP)
is specified by data owners; the key is relevant to the at-
tribute set A_u (A_u is holded by the data user). Only if
A_u satisfies A_CP can the ciphertext be decrypted.
Both KP-ABE and CP-ABE can achieve data confidenti-
ality and fine-grained access control.
However, ABE allows users to share the same sets of
attributes, and the decryption keys are generated with
attributes sets without any identification information,
which cause a problem: once the malicious key delega-
tion happens, we cannot determine the owner’s identifi-
cation of the given key. To address this problem, there
are two main ideas: one is to prevent the key from being
cloned and misused, just like [15–19], the other one is
to provide traceability, proposed and improved in [20–25].
In [20], the scheme proposes methods to trace the source
of leaks and traitors in broadcast encryption; an index
identifying a user is the foundation of realizing traceability.
In [25], Ma et al. propose a new notion called multi-
authority attribute-based traitor tracing. A pair of ele-
ments is introduced to describe a user, one represents its
attribute set while the other one indicates its identity in-
formation. Based on the white box traceable CP-ABE [11],
Liu et al. propose the black box traceable CP-ABE in 2015
[26]. In [11], the traceability is added to the CP-ABE
scheme without weakening its security. Although the
length of the ciphertext and decryption key is changed,
the overhead is not increased significantly. In [27],
the white-box traceable CP-ABE in large universe is
realized and the storage for traitor tracing is constant.
Katz et al. introduce the traceability into predicate
encryption schemes in [28], which has the general ap-
plicability. Ning et al. firstly propose an accountable
authority CP-ABE scheme that supports white box
traceability in [29], which solved two types of key abuse
problems simultaneously.
There are several studies on ciphertext delegation, and
one of the approaches is to utilize proxy re-encryption.
The proxy re-encryption(PRE) technique encrypts the ci-
phertexts with re-encryption keys and makes it possible
for users to decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertexts with
their own original decryption keys without changing. In
[30], Luo et al. realize proxy re-encryption in CP-ABE
scheme, with AND-gates that support multi-value attri-
butes, negative attributes, and wildcards, the encryptor
could choose any ciphertext to re-encrypt as they like.
Lai et al. formalize a new cryptographic primitive called
adaptable ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption,
which allows a semi-trusted proxy to modify a cipher-
text under one access policy into another one of the
same plaintext under any other access policies [31].
In [32, 33], Kaitai Liang et al. further optimize the
system security and integrate the dual system encryp-
tion technology to realize the adaptively CCA secure
in the standard model.
Table 1 shows the comparison between our work and
other related works.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Bilinear maps and complexity assumptions
Let G0 and G1 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of
prime order p and g be the generator of G0.
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The bilinear map e is, e:G0 ×G0→G1, for all a, b ∈ ℤp:
1. Bilinearity: ∀u, v ∊G1, e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab
2. Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) ≠ 1
3. Symmetric: e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab = e(gb, ga)
Definition 1 Discrete logarithm (DL) problem:
Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p
and g be its generator, given y ∊ RG as input, try to get
x ∈ ℤp that y = g
x.
The DL assumption holds in G if it is computationally
infeasible to solve DL problem in G.
3.2 Access structure
Let P = {P1, P2,…, Pn} be a set of participants, let U =
2{P1,P2,…, Pn} be the universal set. If ∃ AS⊆U\{∅}, then
AS can be viewed as an access structure.
If A ∊AS, ∀B ∊U, A⊆ B, and B ∊AS, then AS is
monotonic.
If AS is an access structure, then the sets in it are
called the authorized sets, and the sets not in it are
called the unauthorized sets.
The access structure in our system is an access tree,
which is the same as in [14]. The tree includes a root
node, some interior nodes and some leaf nodes. The leaf
nodes are associated with descriptive attributes while the
interior nodes represent the logic operation, such as
AND (n of n), OR (1 of n), n of m (m > n). A user can
decrypt the ciphertext correctly only if the access tree is
satisfied by his attributes set.
3.3 Notations
In Table 2, the notations used in this paper are listed.
DO and DR are cloud users. DR1, DR2, and DR3 denote
different data receivers. IA, RA, and AA are responsible
for generating essential components of SK. KDS plays a
role of generating new SK for new coming users based
on the given SK if and only if new user’s attribute set is
the subset of the attribute set of the data owner that
owns the given SK. CDS supports the user to re-encrypt
his ciphertext with his own new access structure (AS)
without the need to decrypt it.
4 Our system
We construct a new traceable CP-ABE system with ac-
cess tree and focus on how to realize the key delegation
and the ciphertext delegation based on our system. In
order to achieve all this, our system is composed of the
following parties: a Data Owner, some Data Receivers,
and three authorities, the Key Delegation Servers, the
Ciphertext Delegation Servers, the Cloud Server and two
Decryption Servers.
DO sends his ciphertext to CS. We list three users in
Fig. 1, which are viewed as the different participants in
three functions. DR1 applies to authorities for decryption
key, and the three authorities (IA, RA, AA) collaborate to
generate a complete decryption key. Different authority
outputs different key components. DR2 is a new user
whose attributes set is a subset of DR1. KDS can be
viewed as a substitute for AA, which is used for generating
attribute-related components according to the DR1’s key
and finally outputs a DSK for DR2. There are some ci-
phertexts that can be decrypted by DR1, but DR1 wants
some other users who belong to some attributes sets to
decrypt them without changing the users’ decryption keys.
At this point, the CDS will handle the request and finally
outputs a DCT for DR3 (DR3 denotes the eligible).
We use an access tree ~T to express the access policy
specified by data owners. We introduce a hash function
H:{0, 1}*→G0 and view it as a random oracle, which
maps any attribute described as a binary string to a ran-
dom group element.







Reference [11] √ √ × ×
Reference [14] × √ √ ×
Reference [26] √ √ × ×
Reference [27] √ √ × ×
Reference [28] √ √ × ×
Reference [29] √ √ × ×














RA Random number authority
AA Attribute authority
KDS Key delegation server
CDS Ciphertext delegation server
CS Cloud server
TDS Trusted decryption server
SDS Semi-trusted decryption server
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4.1 Setup
When the system starts up, the setup algorithm will
choose a multiplicative cyclic group G0 of prime order p
with generator g and three random numbers a, α, β ∈ ℤP.
The public key is:
PK ¼ G0; g; h ¼ gβ; e g; gð Þα; k ¼ gω; l ¼ ka
 
The master key is:
MK ¼ β; gα; a;ωf g
This paper uses the Shamir’ t ; nð Þ threshold gates
scheme to store tracing information that proposed in
[27].
IA receives all MK components and keeps f(x)7 and
t−1 points x1 y1ð Þ; x2 y2ð Þ;…; xt−1 yt−1ð Þf g as secret [27],
while AA and RA get one of the MK component a,
which is used to protect the parameters transmitted
between them.
A symmetric encryption algorithm is introduced into
the three authorities to encrypt the components of a se-
cret key. The symmetric encryption keys are assigned to
the three authorities, IA receives K1 and K2, RA receives
K3, and AA receives K4. KDS receives K4, TDS receives
K2, and SDS receives K3 and K4. CDS acquires the Hash
function.
4.2 Encrypt (PK, M, T)
The encryption algorithm receives message M and
access structure T (denoted by an access tree) from
DO. First, the algorithm chooses a random number
s ∈ ℤP for root node R polynomial, which means
qR(0) = s. Then, it chooses a polynomial qx for each
node x (leaf or none-leaf node) in top down manner,
with the same method to construct the polynomials
proposed in [25].
Let Y be the set of leaf nodes in T. The structure of
the ciphertext is as follows:
CT ¼
~T ; ~C ¼ Me g; gð Þαs;C ¼ hs;
∀y∈Y : Cy ¼ gqy 0ð Þ;Cy0 ¼ H att yð Þð Þqy 0ð Þ
 
4.3 Key generation (MK, PK, id, S)
As shown in Fig. 2, to reduce trust on authority, we
split the authority into three: IA, RA, and AA. They
generate different decryption key components respect-
ively: encrypted random number r, encrypted id, and
attribute-related components. Assume that collusion
is prohibited, none of them will get complete key
information.
When a user DR1 submits his id and attributes set to
IA and AA, both of them run the algorithm to compute
Fig. 2 Key generation
Fig. 1 System model
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the id and attributes. RA chooses a random number r ∈
ℤP and transmits to DR1 after encrypting it:
u2 ¼ EncK3 rð Þ
Recording and encrypting the random number r aim
to prevent the decryption key from being re-randomized
at the user side. u2 will be decrypted when the decryp-
tion starts, and the random number r got from u2 is
used for decrypting. If the re-randomization occurs, the
random number in keys will be changed, it will differ
from r. Thus, decryption will be failed.
The parameter grω will be received at IA, and IA com-
putes as follows:
x ¼ EncK1 idð Þ
y ¼ f xð Þ
c ¼ xjjy










grωð Þc ¼ krc
u1 and D will be sent to DR1, and k
rc will be sent to AA.
AA gets the parameters from IA, chooses random
numbers rj ∈ ℤP, ∀ j ∈ S, and computes as follows:
Dj ¼ krcH jð Þrj
Dj0 ¼ EncK4 grjð Þ
DR1 merges the key components from IA, RA, and AA:
SK ¼ D ¼ g
αþ aþcð Þωr
β gr;D0 ¼ u ¼ u1jju2;






4.4 Key trace (SK)
The trace algorithm reference the method proposed in
[27]. First, the algorithm decrypts u1 to get (x,y) from D0
in user’s key, and then, it checks whether SK is issued by
system.
If xyð Þ∈ x1 y1ð Þ; x2 y2ð Þ;…; xt−1 yt−1ð Þf g; the algorithm
decrypts x to get id of the user. Otherwise, the algorithm
computes the secret of INS t ; nð Þ by interpolating with t
points xyð Þ; x1 y1ð Þ; x2 y2ð Þ;…; xt−1 yt−1ð Þf g: If the recov-
ered secret is equal to f(0), the algorithm decrypts x to
get id of the user. If not, SK is not issued by the system
and cannot be traced.
IA stores the f(x) when system sets up, and it holds
the symmetric keys K1 and K2 that can decrypt x. So, IA
runs the algorithm when a key needs to be traced.
4.5 Key delegation (SK, id’)
As shown in Fig. 3, KDS runs this algorithm when a
new user’s attribute set is a subset of the given key’s
owner. Let us assume that DR1 is the given key’s
owner and DR2 is the new user whose set is a subset
of DR1.
IA and RA can decrypt u1 and u2, respectively; the
former will compute new (x,y) according new user’s id,
and the latter will re-randomize the random number.
The parameter generation and transmission process of
this section is similar to the key generation. RA gets the
random number r from the given key SK and chooses a
new random number r ' ∈ ℤP for DR2, passing g
(r+r’)ω, grω
to IA.
u2 ¼ EncK3 r þ r0ð Þ
IA gets the parameter from RA, gets c from the
given key SK, and computes as follows: (id’ denotes
the DR2’s id)
Fig. 3 Key delegation
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grωð Þc ¼ krc
x ¼ EncK1 id0ð Þ
y ¼ f xð Þ
c0 ¼ xjjy
u1 ¼ EncK2 c0ð Þ
g rþr
0ð Þω c0 ¼ k rþr0ð Þc0
D ¼ g αβ g





αþ aþcð Þω rþr0ð Þ
β grþr
0
KDS receives D, u2, u1, k
rc, k(r+r’)c’ and chooses rj ' ∈ ℤP,
then computes as follows:
rjrj0 ¼ rm
Dm ¼ k rþr0ð Þc0 Djkrc
 rj 0
¼ k rþr0ð Þc0H mð Þrm
DecK4 Dm
0ð Þ ¼ grjrj 0 ¼ grm
We assume that KDS does not keep any information
about the Hash function, so Dk cannot be calculated like
this:
Dm ¼ k rþr0ð Þc0 Djkrc
 
H mð ÞrjH mð Þrj 0
¼ h rþr0ð Þc0H mð Þrjþrj 0
The new delegation key is:
SK 0 ¼
D ¼ g
αþ aþcð Þω rþr0ð Þ
β grþr
0 ;D0 ¼ u ¼ u1jju2;





4.6 Ciphertext delegation (CT, PK, AS, D0, Dj, Dj’)
CDS is a trusted server, it stores the Hash function
H : {0, 1}*→G0 to generate new access tree according
the given access structure. It receives some decryption
key components and a new access structure AS from
DR1, while D0 includes the owner’s identity informa-
tion and random number, which can be used for
decrypting.
We first decrypt the access tree embedded in the ci-
phertext and get two expressions. Next, the ciphertext
will be re-encrypted with AS. Then, D0, the expressions,
and re-encrypted ciphertext make up the new delegated
ciphertext.
When x is a leaf node, let i = att(x). Function att(x)
denotes the attribute associated with the leaf node x
in the tree. The ciphertext is not required to be
decrypted completely, the components D0, Dj, Dj’ are
enough. Both of DecryptNodeL_A’ DecryptNodeL_A0
and DecryptNodeNL are run in SDS. It can decrypt
u2 to get r.
If i∈S
DecryptNodeL A0 CT ;PK ; SK ; xð Þ




rcH ið Þri gωað Þr; gqx 0ð Þ 
e gri ;H ið Þrið Þ
¼
e kr aþcð Þ; gqx 0ð Þ
 	
e H ið Þri ; gqx 0ð Þ 
e gri ;H ið Þrið Þ
¼
e kr aþcð Þ; gqx 0ð Þ
 	
e H ið Þ; gqx 0ð Þ
 	riqx 0ð Þ
e g;H ið Þriqx 0ð Þð
¼ e gωr aþcð Þ; gqx 0ð Þ 
¼ e g; gð Þωr aþcð Þqx 0ð Þ
DecryptNode CT ;D0;Di;Di0;Rð Þ ¼ e g; gð Þωr aþcð Þs
Otherwise,
i ∉ S,DecryptNodeL_A’(CT, PK, SK, x) = ⊥ When x is
an interior node, call the algorithm DecryptNodeNL
(CT,D0,Di,Di’,x).
For all nodes z that are children of x, it calls
DecryptNodeL_A’(CT,PK,D0,Di,Di’,z) and stores the
output as Fz. Let Sx be a kx (the threshold value of
interior node) random set and let Fz ≠ ⊥. If no such
set exists, the function outputs ⊥.








i ¼ index zð Þ
S
0




























¼ e g; gð Þω cþað Þr⋅qx 0ð Þ
For root node R,
A0 ¼ e g; gð Þωsr cþað Þ
Repeat the steps described above, however, Decrypt-
NodeL_A’ algorithm is changed to DecryptNodeL_A0:
DecryptNodeL A0 CT ;D0;Di;Di0; xð Þ
¼ e Di;Cxð Þ
e DecK4 Di
0ð Þ;Cx0ð Þ
¼ e g; gð Þωqx 0ð Þrc
For root node R,
A0 ¼ e g; gð Þωsrc
Then, A1 ¼ A0A0 ¼ e g; gð Þ
ωsra
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C^ ¼ A0jjA1jjD0
A0 and A1 are the expressions mentioned above; they
will become the components of the delegated ciphertext
with D0.
Next, CDS re-encrypts the other CT components as
the Encrypt algorithm does. It constructs an access tree
~T for AS specified by DR1 and chooses a new random
number s ' ∈ ℤp:
~C ¼ Me g; gð Þαsð Þe g; gð Þαs0
C ¼ hshs0
C^ ¼ A0jjA1jjD0;
Cz ¼ gqz 0ð Þ; z∈SAS
Cz 0 ¼ H att zð Þð Þqz 0ð Þ; z∈SAS
We get the delegated ciphertext as follows:
CT 0 ¼ ~T ; ~C ; C^ ;C;Cz;Cz 0
 
4.7 Decrypt (PK, CT, SK)
In fact, decryption can be viewed as two parts: satisfying
the access tree and decrypting the ciphertext.
We introduce two servers to carry on the process re-
spectively. SDS possesses symmetric key K4 and K3 so
that it can get random number and verify whether his
set satisfies the access tree or not and run the algo-
rithms: DecryptNodeL_A’, DecryptNodeL_A0, Decrypt-
NodeNL. TDS possesses symmetric key K2 so that it can
decrypt u1.
The general decryption process is described as follows:
When x is a leaf node, let i = att(x). Function att(x) de-
notes the attribute associated with the leaf node x in the
tree. SDS decrypts u2 to get random number r.
If If i∈S
DecryptNodeL A0 CT ;PK ; SK ; xð Þ




rcH ið Þri gωað Þr; gqx 0ð Þ 
e gri ;H ið Þrið Þ
¼
e kr aþcð Þ; gqx 0ð Þ
 	
e H ið Þri ; gqx 0ð Þ 
e gri ;H ið Þrið Þ
¼
e kr aþcð Þ; gqx 0ð Þ
 	
e H ið Þ; gqx 0ð Þ
 	riqx 0ð Þ
e g;H ið Þriqx 0ð Þð
¼ e gωr aþcð Þ; gqx 0ð Þ 
¼ e g; gð Þωr aþcð Þqx 0ð Þ
DecryptNode CT ;D0;Di;Di0;Rð Þ ¼ e g; gð Þωr aþcð Þs
Otherwise, i ∉ S DecryptNodeL_A’(CT, PK, SK, x) = ⊥
When x is an interior node, call the algorithm
DecryptNodeNL(CT,SK,x).
For all nodes z that are children of x, it calls Decrypt-
NodeL_A’(CT,PK,SK,z) and stores the output as Fz. Let
Sx be a kx (the threshold value of interior node) random
set and let Fz ≠ ⊥. If no such set exists, the function out-
puts ⊥.








i ¼ index zð Þ
S
0




























¼ e g; gð Þω cþað Þr⋅qx 0ð Þ
For root node R,
A0 ¼ e g; gð Þωsr cþað Þ
Then, TDS decrypts u1 and computes as follows:
















 	 ¼ Me g; gð Þαs
e g; gð Þ αþωr aþcð Þð Þs
The user gets A’ from SDS and gets B from TDS:
A0 ¼ e g; gð Þωr aþcð Þs
When a user DR3 try to decrypt a delegated ciphertext
from DR1, the structure of the ciphertext is as follows: r’
and c’ denote DR1’s random number and identity infor-
mation and r and c denote DR3’s random number and
identity information.
CT 0 ¼ ~T ; ~C; C^ ;C;Cz;Cz 0
 
Compared with the original ciphertext, the massage M
is encrypted with (s + s’) instead of s, and the access
structure is replaced by AS. DR3 decrypts the access tree
and get an expression related to s’, which can be used for
decrypting correctly with C’ and C0 in DCT.
We can get Ĉ from CT’: Ĉ = A0||A1||D0,
SDS computes (we only consider when the user’s set
satisfies the access tree):
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DecryptNodeL A0 CT 0; SK 0; xð Þ
¼ e Di;Cxð Þ
e DecK4 Di0ð Þ;Cx0ð Þ
¼ e g; gð Þωqx 0 0ð Þr0c0






0ð Þ;Cz 0ð Þ
¼ e g; gð Þωqz 0 0ð Þr0 c0það Þ
For root node R’, the intermediate calculation process
is omitted.
B0 ¼ e g; gð Þωs
0r0c0




¼ e g; gð Þωs0r0a
All of them are transferred to SDS:
r0 ¼ Dec u20ð Þ
r ¼ Dec u2ð Þ
B1 ¼ A0ð Þr
0
r ¼ e g; gð Þωrasð Þr0r ¼ e g; gð Þωr0as
B2 ¼ B^ ¼ e g; gð Þωr
0as0
B3 ¼ A1ð Þr
0
r ¼ e g; gð Þωrcsð Þr0r ¼ e g; gð Þωr0cs







  ¼ Me g; gð Þ
α sþs0ð Þ e g; gð Þωr0as
 	







¼ Me g; gð Þ






 ! ¼ Me g; gð Þ αþωr0að Þ sþs0ð Þ
e g; gð Þ αþωr0 aþc0ð Þð Þ sþs0ð Þ
A and B3 will be sent to TDS:
c ¼ Dec u1ð Þ c0 ¼ Dec u10ð Þ




c ¼ e g; gð Þωr0c0s
M0 ¼ AB5 ¼ Me g; gð Þ




 αþωr0 aþc0ð Þð Þ sþs0ð Þ
The user will get M’ from TDS and B4 from SDS; thus,
the message can be calculated as follows:
M ¼ M0B4 ¼ Me g; gð Þ
αþωr0að Þ sþs0ð Þe g; gð Þωr0c0se g; gð Þωr0c0s0
e g;gð Þ αþωr0 aþc0ð Þð Þ sþs0ð Þ
¼ Me g; gð Þ
αþωr0 aþc0ð Þð Þ sþs0ð Þ
e g; gð Þ αþωr0 aþc0ð Þð Þ sþs0ð Þ
5 Security analysis
5.1 Traceability
In [22], the access structure is a share-generating matrix,
while in our system, the access structure is an access
tree.
Theorem 1 The security of traceability in our system is
no weaker than that of [22].
Proof The decryption key in our system has partially
similar structure with the key in [22]. D ¼ gαþ aþcð Þωrβ gr in-
cludes master keys β, gα, a, ω, a random number r, and a
parameter c that denotes the user’s identity information.
K ¼ g αaþcð ÞhtR includes master keys α, a, public key h,
random numbers t and R, and a parameter c that de-
notes the user’s identity information. Compared with K
in [22], we construct D with extra master keys β and ω,






According to security proof in [22], the design of the
decryption key is secure. Thus, D ¼ gαþ aþcð Þωrβ gr in our sys-
tem is secure.
Theorem 2 The security of the traceable decryption
key in our system is no weaker than that of [25].
Proof In Dj ¼ krcH jð Þrj ; we add master key ω and the
parameter c to Dj in [25] Dj ¼ grH jð Þrj
 
: Additionally,
the other components are protected by symmetric en-
cryption. Thus, the security in this component is no
weaker than that of [25].
5.2 Key delegation
This part of function is realized by KDS, IA and RA,
which means AA is replaced by KDS to some extent.
SK = (D, D0, Dk, Dk’), D and D0 are generated by IA
and RA, and Dk and Dk’ will be calculated by KDS
according to the given key’s information.
Theorem 3 It is computationally infeasible to attack
the calculation of KDS.
Proof KDS receives another two parameters krc, k(r+r’)c’
from IA, which can be used for calculating and re-
randomizing attribute-related components of the key.
The values all of those KDS receives and retrieves are
krc; k rþr
0ð Þc0 ; krcH jð Þrj ; grj ;H jð Þrj
According to DL problem, it is computationally infeas-
ible to retrieve rj, rc and (r + r’)c’, let alone r or c. Thus, a
semi-trusted server can be designated as KDS, which is
competent in this work.
5.3 Ciphertext delegation
It can be considered as two parts: decrypting the access
tree and re-encrypting with another specified access tree.
Decrypting the access tree in our system is analogous to
the decrypt algorithm in [25]. And, re-encryption is
analogous to the encrypt algorithm in [25].
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Fig. 4 a Encryption cost in CP-ABE and KD-TABE. b Computation cost of RA and IA is constant, which has no relationship with attributes number
of DR’s attributes set. c Computation cost of AA grows with the rise of attributes number in DR’s attributes set. d Storage cost of RA and IA grows
with the rising of DR. e Decryption cost of SDS (A) and TDS(B)
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Theorem 4 The security in ciphertext delegation is no
weaker than that in [25].
A’ = e(g, g)ωsr(c+a), A1 = e(g, g)
ωsra, A0 = e(g, g)
ωsrc are
intermediate results in our system, compared with A =
e(g, g)sr in [14], the extra master key β, a is introduced to
further protect the random number s.
~C 0 ¼ Me g; gð Þαs e g; gð Þαs0 ¼ Me g; gð Þα sþs0ð Þ
C0 ¼ hshs0 ¼ h sþs0ð Þ
We re-encrypt with a new s ' ∈ ℤp chosen by CDS, ~C ;
C have been proved to be secure in [25]. Thus, by that
analogy, ~C 0;C0 in our system is secure.
6 Performance evaluation
6.1 Setup
The Setup procedure includes defining multiplicative
cyclic group and generating PK and MK that will be
used in encryption and key generation. There are three
exponentiation operations and one pairing operation;
three random numbers are chosen in Setup procedure.
Time complexity of the procedure is O(1).
6.2 Encrypt
Plaintext and access tree are encrypted in this procedure,
the computation cost is proportional to the number of at-
tributes in the tree. If the universal attributes set in T is I
(|I| denotes the total number of attribute in set I), for each
element in I, it needs two exponentiation operations, to-
tally, the computation complexity is O (|I|). Compared
with CP-ABE, we add an exponentiation operation in this
algorithm, and the added operation has no obvious influ-
ence on computation cost as shown in Fig. 4a.
6.3 Key generation
This algorithm includes three parts: RA tackles the ran-
dom number computation; IA computes the id informa-
tion; AA generates the attribute-related key components.
The time complexity of RA and IA is O(1) as shown in
Fig. 4b. Computation cost of AA is proportional to the
number of attributes is DR’s set, when the attribute
number is m, the time complexity is O(m) as shown in
Fig. 4c.
We add the severe RA and IA to achieve the id em-
bedding in SK, RA needs to store the computation result
of u2, IA stores results of u1, D, k
arc, the total storage
cost is proportional to the number of DR. If each result
needs 2 bytes, the storage cost of RA and IA is shown in
Fig. 4d.
6.4 Key delegation
For each DR, KDS computes the unique SK. The com-
putation process and cost are similar to RA. The total
cost is proportional to the number of DR.
6.5 Decrypt
This algorithm also includes three parts: SDS decrypts
the access tree in CT, TDS decrypts the rest part, and
DR retrieves the final message. Thus, computation cost
of SDS is proportional to the attributes number in DR’s
set, and computation cost of TDS is constant as shown
in Fig. 4e.
In brief, our system costs no more than CP-ABE by
analysis but achieves more functions compared with
existing works [22, 25].
7 Conclusions
Traceable CP-ABE is an important branch of CP-ABE,
retaining the characteristics of CP-ABE. However, it can-
not trace the owner with a decryption key. In contrast,
key delegation is not supported in traceable CP-ABE.
Without key delegation, the overhead will be very heavy
due to the large number of new coming mobile users in
MCC. Therefore, we re-constructed a new traceable CP-
ABE system that supported key delegation and cipher-
text delegation. We realized key delegation without loss
of the traceability with the same computation overhead.
To realize ciphertext delegation, we abandoned the re-
encryption key and tried to decrypt the access tree first
and re-encrypt the ciphertext with any monotonic access
tree specified by the user next. In the future, we will
study on making our system work under large universe
and support more functions such as revocation.
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